Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017

The Role of Contextual Factors in the
Influence of ICT on Street-Level Discretion
Peter André Busch
University of Agder, Norway
peter.a.busch@uia.no

Abstract
Public service workers in the frontline have
traditionally enjoyed a wide freedom to make decisions
during policy implementation. Research shows that
technology has both constraining and enabling effects
on public service workers affecting their ability to
exercise discretion. What remains unclear is under
which circumstances discretion is influenced by
technology. Using a case study approach and drawing
on neo-institutional theory, this paper studies a court
to identify contextual factors affecting the
phenomenon. Findings show that technology has no
unilateral effect on street-level discretion, and is found
moderated by contextual factors such as the degree of
social complexity in a case, skills possessed by public
service workers, and the need for face-to-face contact.
Furthermore, the influence of technology on streetlevel discretion depends on the technology in use.

1. Introduction
While democratically elected representatives decide
on new policies, the actual outcome experienced by
citizens in the end comes down to street-level
bureaucrats who implement them [1]. The
discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats is well
established in literature [2]. However, the introduction
of information and communications technology (ICT)
has been identified to have both constraining and
enabling effects on street-level bureaucrats affecting
their ability to exercise discretion [3]. Reducing
discretion may invoke more standardized processes
and erode individualized service. Alternatively, ICT
may function as an action resource for street-level
bureaucrats and empower them. What is less
researched is under which conditions discretion is
influenced by technology. Street-level bureaucracies
have many similarities but there are also considerable
differences. For example, they may vary in regards to
inter-agency dependency, degree of centralized
structures, or type of work tasks. The purpose of this
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paper is to identify contextual factors that function as
moderators in the influence of ICT on discretion.
Street-level bureaucrats refer to public service
workers such as judges, teachers, and social workers
who interact directly with citizens and can exercise
substantial discretion in their work [1]. Discretion is
the freedom street-level bureaucrats have to make
decisions concerning individuals regarding the sort,
quality and quantity of sanctions, and rewards during
policy implementation including the possibility of no
sanction at all [1]. E-government is the use of ICT “to
design new or to redesign existing information
processing and communication practices in order to
achieve a better government” [4, p. 237]. Internally,
ICT is used to automate, semi-automate, or support
work practices. Externally, ICT and the Internet in
particular, have been utilized to improve service
quality and interactions between government and
citizens as well as achieving higher public value ideals
such as openness, accountability, and legitimacy [5].
Street-level bureaucrats experience a dilemma.
While they are obligated to treat citizens alike, they
also need to take individualized concerns into
consideration [1]. ICT can influence this tension.
Reducing discretion is welcomed from a top-down
perspective where discretion often is regarded as an
option for street-level bureaucrats to pursue own goals
violating public sector values and ideals such as
fairness, equality for law, and trust [2]. From a bottomup perspective, discretion is viewed as inevitable to
provide personalized service taking social complexity
into account, and technology is considered an action
resource for street-level bureaucrats [2].
Research concerned with the influence of ICT on
street-level discretion is scarce [3] and has mainly
focused on social workers. Some studies conclude that
ICT is reducing or eliminating street-level discretion,
whereas other studies show nuanced effects.
Furthermore, studies concerned with contextual factors
relate them to rationality pressures such as demands for
higher efficiency and effectiveness, where managers
are forced to limit discretionary power [6, 7].
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The phenomenon is explored through a case study
of a Norwegian district court. The judges manage a
variety of cases applying a wide range of legal rules. A
court is particularly interesting because of its
independent position in the constitution common in
many countries. The findings from the case study are
analyzed by utilizing concepts from neo-institutional
theory [8] and discussed by considering identified
value positions for e-government [9]. The study is a
part of a larger research project aiming at investigating
how contextual factors are moderating the influence of
ICT on street-level discretion.

2. Literature review
Within the information systems discipline, the view
of ICT and organizational change has evolved from
early deterministic models to models considering
social, political, and cultural factors [10].

2.1. The influence of ICT on street-level
discretion
Negative influence. Studies have found that ICT is
influencing discretion negatively through information
systems with various degree of automation. Increased
routinization caused a reduction in discretionary power
where professionals felt their autonomy weakened and
decision-making was reduced to tiny adjustments [6,
11, 12]. The persuasiveness of a computer screen is
found to be immense and as a result public service
workers are afraid of defying it [13, 14]. Furthermore,
technology prevent street-level bureaucrats from
manipulating
information
streams
through
intermediary positions [15]. Some studies show that
professional expertise was impaired when decisionmaking was shifted from professionals to citizens [16]
and unqualified staff [17], and these shifts created
tensions within the organizations.
Public services such as issuing traffic fines and
allocating grants for students can now be done entirely
without the assistance of street-level bureaucrats
through the use of automated information systems [14,
18]. One study warned about the irreversible effects of
decisions made by such systems [13]. While some
street-level bureaucracies are able to utilize automated
information systems; the findings from these cases
cannot be easily transferred to traditional street-level
bureaucracies such as courts, police departments, and
schools [3, 18]. Automation is mainly used in streetlevel bureaucracies that handle thousands of cases
using schematic legal rules [18].
Nuanced influence. Technology can be used for
managerial supervision of formal aspects of work such

as the numbers of applications, discrepancies, and
complaints. However, ICT makes it difficult for
managers to supervise informal aspects, i.e., how
discretion is effectively used. This use is highly
dependent on the task to be controlled and other
contextual factors [3, 19]. While street-level
bureaucrats can alternate between a personalizedflexible and distant-rigid strategy in face-to-face
encounters, this is less possible using technology and
thus restricts street-level discretion [20]. Additionally,
computerized procedures may restrict street-level
bureaucrats simply because the number of options is
reduced, and could even provide them with an excuse;
“the computer says what the computer says” [21, p.
574] thus hiding the discretion effectively used [14].
Furthermore, ICT can provide street-level bureaucrats
with much data on their clients and hence make it
possible to exert closer control over them [22].

2.2. Contextual factors
Specific conditions of street-level bureaucracies
affect the influence of technology on discretion.
Organizations that process a large amount of cases
with many workers performing similar tasks have been
found to rely more easily on informatization [18].
Centralized structures experience more pressures to
utilize automation than decentralized structures since
large-scale organizations can capitalize more easily on
economy-of-scale arguments [18]. Also, street-level
bureaucracies with efficiency oriented managers are
more prone to use ICT for reducing discretion [18, 23].
Rationality pressures make managers prioritize
productivity where the discretionary power of streetlevel bureaucrats suffers [6, 7]. Houston [24] argues
that rationality objectives emphasize efficiency
excessively on behalf of the quality of service delivery.

3. Neo-institutional theory perspective
Neo-institutional theory aims at providing
explanations of organizational behavior and is
appropriate for examining the complex relationships
between
ICT,
organizational
characteristics,
institutional
arrangements,
and
environmental
conditions [8, 25]. Neo-institutional theory argues that
organizational actors do not act solely on the rationalactor models of classical economists but according to
social and cultural pressures to conform to current
structural forms [8, 26, 27] sometimes “without any
real reflection” [28, p. 176]. Thus, organizational
actors do not necessarily seek to maximize efficiency
and effectiveness but act because of “irrationalities’
arising within the institutional context” [8, p. 369]
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seeking legitimacy more than efficiency. Legitimacy is
the “congruence between the social values associated
with or implied by [organizational] activities and the
norms of acceptable behavior in the larger social
system” [29, p. 122] with the purpose of becoming “a
member-in-good-standing of its class” [30, p. 94, 31].
Legitimacy is considered to be the core concept in neoinstitutional theory [8]. Institutions are not
organizations but “social structures that have attained a
high degree of resilience” [32, p. 48] with the purpose
of producing meaning and stability, i.e., they are
values, norms, rules, beliefs, and taken-for-granted
assumptions. These institutions can move from place to
place and time to time using carriers in which they are
embedded. These carriers are symbolic systems (e.g.,
rules, laws, and values), relational systems (e.g.,
governance systems and authority systems), routines
(e.g., protocols and roles), or artifacts (e.g., objects that
comply with standards and possess symbolic value)
[32, 33].
Institutional effects consider how institutions affect
organizations, organizational entities, and other
institutions [34]. DiMaggio and Powell [35] introduce
the term isomorphism and present three types of
institutional pressures: coercive, mimetic, and
normative (see Table 1). Isomorphism refer to "a
homogeneity of structures observed in several fields"
[8, p. 370]. Organizations respond to these pressures
through various strategies. Oliver [36] proposes five
strategic responses exerted through tactics that
organizations enact to gain, maintain, or repair their
legitimacy (see Table 2).
The influence of ICT on street-level discretion is
affected by social, political, and cultural factors [3]. In
this study, neo-institutional theory assists in
understanding how these factors exert pressures on the
judges when they make decisions, and how and why
judges respond to these pressures. The judges’ central
institutions (investigated through public value
positions) were identified. The strategic responses
judges had to institutional pressures, in the form of
competing value positions, were explained by
contextual factors and guided by the taken-for-granted
institutions among judges.

4. Research method

Table 1. Institutional pressures [35]
Institutional
pressure
Coercive

Mimetic

Normative

Description
Formal (standards) and informal (culture)
pressures. Exerted upon an organization by
other organizations in an institutional
environment.
Sources: Dependency, cultural
expectations, and governmental
requirements through law.
Imitation of other organizations that are
perceived to be more legitimate encouraged
by uncertainty related to e.g., poorly
understood technologies.
Sources: Consulting firms, industry trade
associations, and employee transfers.
Pressures that stems from
professionalization. Professionals seek to
define their work conditions and ensure
autonomy.
Sources: Inter-organizational networks,
professional associations, and educational
institutions.

Table 2. Strategic responses
to institutional pressures [36]
Strategic
response
Acquiescence

Tactic

Description

Habit

Following invisible, takenfor-granted norms
Mimicking institutional
models
Obeying rules and accepting
norms
Balancing the expectations of
multiple constituents
Placating and
accommodating institutional
elements
Negotiating with institutional
stakeholders
Disguising nonconformity
Loosening institutional
attachments
Changing goals, activities, or
domains
Ignoring explicit norms and
values
Contesting rules and
requirements
Assaulting the sources of
institutional pressure
Importing influential
constituents
Shaping values and criteria
Dominating institutional
constituents and processes

Imitate
Comply
Compromise

Balance
Pacify

Bargain
Avoidance

Conceal
Buffer
Escape

Defiance

Dismiss
Challenge

This research was conducted using a case study which
is suitable to represent a unique case and when
there is a lack of theory [37]. While a case study has
limited generalizability, it can shed light on unique
situations. An exploratory case study design was
selected for the collection of rich descriptive data.

Attack
Manipulation

Co-opt
Influence
Control
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4.1. Context and case description
Norway is a constitutional monarchy adhering to
the principle of separation of powers prevalent in many
countries. The parliament is the legislative branch with
the power to issue new legislation. The executive
branch is responsible for enforcing legal order and has
substantial influence on the legislative process with the
opportunity to issue directives. The judicial branch
solves disputes based on law and consists of a Supreme
Court, appeal courts, and district courts.
The studied district court has more than 15 judges
with an average age of approximately 50 years. The
court handles more than 7,000 cases every year
(including trials). Some of the trials are held with two
lay judges. While the administrative staff of the court
is under the authority of The National Courts
Administration (NCA), each judge is independent. The
role of the chief judge is to coordinate the work in the
court but he cannot instruct a judge to pronounce a
certain verdict in any case.
The judges use several information systems in their
work. Lovisa is the main system to handle workflow
and information processing needs in the court. The
adaptive case management system provides detailed
support for complex legal processes, and is used by all
district and appeal courts to ensure that legal processes
are executed according to law. Law Data and Court
Data are two database systems similar to each other
with access to collections of online legal resources
including laws, verdicts, and scholarly commentaries.
The court was selected as case because of the
independent role judges have in the constitution, and a
large amount of various cases every year. Judges have
traditionally enjoyed a great amount of discretionary
power, and they apply a wide variety of legal rules to
solve many different cases and inquiries such as
weddings, bankruptcies, and serious criminal cases
such as child abuse and murder.

4.2. Qualitative interviews
A list of judges including the chief judge, “regular”
judges, and assistant judges was presented to the
researcher for purposeful sampling. Within the second
and third group, informants were selected at random.
Only one judge held the position as chief judge and he
was considered an important informant to obtain a
management perspective on the phenomenon. Two
judges were assistant judges in qualifying positions
whose opinions were deemed important since they are
less experienced and were expected to rely more
heavily on ICT to find necessary information. In total,
seven qualitative interviews of judges were conducted.

All interviews were recorded and lasted, on
average, approximately 45 minutes. The interviews
were conducted within a period of eight months and by
a single researcher ensuring equal conditions during
data collection. After transcribing them, the judges
were given the opportunity to correct any errors in the
transcribed text. The interviews were semi-structured
and formulated with open-ended questions to allow
informants to speak freely [38]. The informants were
asked about topics such as how the court was managed,
current information systems and the use of them, and
specific conditions influencing the usage.

4.3. Participant observations
To gain in-depth knowledge of contextual factors
influencing the phenomenon, one researcher engaged
in participant observation of three one-day trials in situ.
The trials were selected based on the opportunity to
participate and held within a period of 14 months. The
trials were led by a judge assisted by two lay judges
(including the researcher) and dealt with cases of
violence and misconduct. Field notes were written
down after the trials ended. The field notes focused on
how the judge sought information about the cases and
the defendants, the general and individual aspects of
each case, and how the verdict was decided. No
utterances were written down verbatim but instead the
essence of the utterances was sought captured.

4.4. Data analysis
The data was analyzed to identify unique patterns
in the data material [39]. Standard grounded theory
techniques were used [40]. The analysis began with
revealing the underlying meanings and ideas in the
data material using open coding. The coding was based
on the language used by the interviewees and the field
notes from the participatory observations. Thereafter,
axial coding was applied to identify relationships
between the codes informed by concepts from
institutional theory. A third grounded theory technique,
selective coding, is applied to build theory but in this
paper contextual factors are reported, which are mainly
the results of the axial coding.

5. Findings
Findings are organized according to the pressures
the court experienced from various groups, contextual
factors as moderators of the influence of ICT on
discretion, and the expected and emergent effects of
ICT.
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5.1. Demands for quality and efficiency
The community organizations in the surrounding
organizational field are the Parliament, NCA, the
district attorney, lawyers, educational institutions, and
other district courts. These organizations subject the
court to institutional pressures. The institutional
pressures promoted two different public value ideals;
the efficiency ideal and the service ideal [9]. The
efficiency ideal is characterized by visions of cost
reduction, and increased productivity and performance
[9]. The service ideal is recognized by quality;
commitment to public interest, citizen centricity, and
service level, which meet the expectations of society
[9]. In court, the coercive pressures are found to
promote both ideals. Judges contrast the efficiency
ideal with the service ideal and this dilemma is similar
to the one observed by Lipsky [1] where the work of
street-level bureaucrats is characterized by adherence
to politically decided policies on the one hand and
responsiveness to individual cases on the other hand.
Coercive pressures occur when stated efficiency
objectives from the Parliament expect judges to
complete cases within a certain period of time. If a
deadline is exceeded, a case will be removed from the
first assigned judge and reallocated to another judge.
This routine is being experienced as slightly stressful:
“If the deadline for a case is exceeded, the case will be
sent back to the chief judge … so, this is a slight stress
factor”. The efficiency of the court is measured
regularly and compared to other district courts in the
country creating a mimetic pressure on the court since
each court “compete” in being most efficient: “Among
the large district courts, our court processes cases
most efficiently”. The chief judge was, as the only
informant, positive to an increased use of automation
for decision support: “I believe it is positive because it
would assist us to quickly get an overview of things
that we may have spent a longer time to figure out. I
am not sure that all judges think the same way. It may
well be that some of the judges would think that this is
not good because there is a risk that we would lean too
much on the automated system”.
ICT provides judges with more information about
court practice and much faster compared to 10-20
years ago. Developments in society have created an
expectation that this information should increase the
quality of court decisions: “You get more information
in each case. Through IT, we now have access to more
legal sources than we had before when we had to go
and look in heavy books. We even lacked access to
some of the legal sources that we have access to now.
So IT influences us by providing a better basis for
making decisions”. Judges trust this information and
do not necessarily look further for any other relevant

information. A judge explains: “Even if it is not
necessarily the intention, it may well be the practical
outcome because it is a busy workday ... I believe that
many judges will make use of systems that can help”.
The
normative
pressure
stemming
from
professionalization is strong because of judges’
independent role in the constitution. Judges will not
allow the court administrative staff or any other
stakeholders to negatively influence the discretionary
power that judges hold, unless the constitution itself is
altered by the Parliament. The understanding of their
role in society is learned and communicated in
educational institutions, and upheld in interorganizational networks and professional associations:
“Judges are trained in a certain way of thinking”.
Furthermore, the chief judge emphasizes that judges
are expected by the legislator to exercise discretion
when making decisions: “A judge has a wide
opportunity to exercise discretion. Not only that, we
are required to do so”. Also, judges are often recruited
from other organizations in the organizational field
such as law firms and the district attorney’s office.

5.2. Contextual factors
Judges prioritize high-quality decisions over
efficiency claiming that discretion is a necessary
prerequisite for quality. They seek to legitimize their
existence by referring to contextual factors. In addition,
the interaction with technology can create emergent
effects influencing how discretion is actually exercised.
Table 3 provides an overview of contextual factors that
are described in more detail below.
Degree of social complexity. The complexity of
human and societal relationships makes it difficult for
the legislator to create laws that cover every possible
situation that may occur. Due to this, laws and
directives are usually formulated in a way that grants
discretionary power to judges. The purpose is to avoid
unreasonable outcomes. A judge explains the reason
for having non-schematic rules: “The legislator would
probably have to consider many possible situations ...
The legislation had been much more complicated ... It
would not fit with real life scenarios because life comes
in so many facets ... There would be so many variations
and factors that had not been foreseen and one would
have risked utterly wrong outcomes in some cases. If
you can exercise discretion, then a rule may be
adapted and the result will be correct”. The degree of
complexity varies from case to case. For example,
between cases about child protection where the main
goal is to achieve a result that is in the best interest of a
child, and cases with speeding where the outcome is
more or less set beforehand. In the former case, it is

2967

Table 3. Contextual factors
Contextual factor
Degree of social
complexity

Societal role of the
public agency
Degree of
professionalization
Skills possessed
by judges

Face-to-face
contact

Consequences of
decisions
Technology
features

Explanation
Life comes in many facets making it
impossible to account for all kinds of
possible scenarios. Discretion is
necessary to adapt policies to real life
situations.
The degree of dependency on another
agencies influence how an agency
considers its “rights”.
Stakeholders such as unions guard the
autonomy certain groups of streetlevel bureaucrats.
The degree of computer literacy
among street-level bureaucrats
determines the influence on
discretion.
Face-to-face contact with citizens is
either required or desired for a best
possible understanding of a case and
its outcome.
Decisions with serious consequences
for a citizen should be made by a
human.
Specific features of technology have
the potential to affect the influence of
discretion.

difficult to use automated solutions since it would be
difficult for a computer to assess what is in the best
interest of a child, even with increasingly more
advanced artificial technologies. In the latter case,
exceptions from the predefined decisions will only be
assessed in a few cases such as speeding to save lives.
Societal role of the public agency. Judges cannot
be instructed to make certain decisions since they are
independent of other public agencies in the executive
branch. One of the judges explains his view on
managerial control of his decisions: “The chief judge
may well read my decision. But he cannot come to me
and say that I should judge in a particular way. It
would have been absolutely impermissible”. The
independent and individual assessment of a case is
important for judges and their discretionary power is
deemed necessary: “This has simply to do with the rule
of law […]. An individual assessment should be made
by a judge. A decision will not be independent and
individual if automation is used”.
Degree of professionalization. Judges as a group
of street-level bureaucrats are highly professionalized
with strict qualification criteria and professional
associations protecting the integrity and rights of the
judges. Due to this, judges tend to conform to norms of
conduct and expectations related to work tasks. The
high degree of professionalization makes judges very
protective of their position in society. They are also
concerned with how society assesses judges as a

profession: “The courts in Norway enjoy a large
degree of trust from society … compared to courts
internationally too”. The discretionary power that
judges enjoy are important for their integrity. Major
efforts are made to ensure that judges are competent to
conduct the tasks of the profession: “The process of
appointing judges is very thorough”.
Skills possessed by public service workers.
Judges have a fairly high average age and many of the
judges are not as computer literate as the younger
judges. The court arranges internal courses on how to
utilize ICT. Still, the younger judges believe that they
are better able to make use of all the features that the
technology in court offers: “I should have liked to see
how the older judges go forth when they search ‘Law
Data’ which is a tool adapted for us. There are dozens
of useful features but you must be aware of them. And
it seems like they spend a lot of time and focus on
training without focusing on the right things. For
example, if everyone could have a course in how to get
the best possible results when searching for verdicts.
This is often what you look for”. The degree to which
ICT is able to provide a judge with more relevant legal
sources and thus provide a better basis for the
judgment depends on the skills of the judges.
Face-to-face contact. In some cases, face-to-face
contact is required. For example, in child protection
cases, a judge is expected to explain the decision that is
made to a child that asks for such an explanation. One
of the judges explains the problems associated with the
use of ICT in these cases: “From a psychological
perspective, one has stressed that children should meet
whoever has made the decision that they should stay
with mom or dad and explain why … this is no easy
task for a computer”. In other cases, face-to-face
contact is not required but still desired. Defendants
would like to inform the judge about their specific case
and the experience of being listened to is stressed. A
judge describes an actual experience: “[The defendant]
gave me good feedback because I had listened to him
… I based my decision on what he had said but I still
came to the opposite result. It was okay. He had been
listened to”.
Consequences of decisions. Judges make many
decisions every day and the consequences vary. In
some criminal cases, the defendant may face many
years in prison. The degree to which technology should
assist when making decisions with such dramatic
consequences, is challenged. One of the judges
explains her approach: “The important thing for me is
that I make good and right decisions ... That they are
as good as possible. That they are as correct as
possible ... Efficiency is also important but it cannot be
that important that we compromise quality. We must
have good quality in what we do”.
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Technology features. In addition, the functions
and capabilities of the information systems in use were
found to influence the phenomenon. ICT is no blackbox and the functions and capabilities of the
information systems must also be considered since
discretion is likely to be influenced according to the
technology in use [41]. For example, templates
provided in one of the systems were found to have a
habitual effect on the street-level bureaucrats.

5.3. Expected and emergent effects of ICT
The judges assessed technology to have no
influence on their discretionary power. The chief judge
elaborates: “As far as I can see, IT has not in any way
limited a judge's ability to exercise discretion … The
judge has a greater opportunity to obtain information
with a better basis for his or her decision. But there
are no restrictions in the judge's ability to exercise
discretion.”. While judges expressed this belief, the
study showed that institutional pressures are being
exerted upon the court that judges are both aware and
unaware of and thus affect how the court respond to
these pressures.
The normative pressure stems from the judges
themselves. The court responds to this pressure
through an acquiescence tactic where the court
consciously and strategically chooses to comply with
this normative pressure. The role of the judge is
discussed regularly in local and national forums where
judges meet, e.g., in the union organizing judges in
Norway: “Almost every judge in the country is a
member of the union … The union discusses various
topics to safeguard both our profession and our role in
society”. The chief judge explains, “there is a dialogue
about these things” among chief judges.
Two coercive pressures are exerted upon the court;
namely pressures towards higher efficiency and better
quality. The analysis shows that judges are not aware
of all the effects of these pressures and the court is thus
precluded from responding accordingly. According to
the taxonomy by Oliver [30], the court responds to
these pressures through acquiescence tactics of
compliance and habit, and a defiance tactic of
dismissal. The main response to the coercive pressures
is compliance; judges conform to the routine of using
technology to gather more information. Even though
more information is collected, technology is so timesaving that it makes them spend less time on each case
now compared to 20 years ago, offering more time on
complex cases. The efficiency goals of the court are
considered legitimate and judges accept such
requirements: “It is important to finish a case. We
cannot spend like 14 days on every case just because it
should be perfected ... so efficiency is important”. The

judges are clearly concerned with the quality of the
decisions they make: “It is okay that efficiency is
important. But it cannot be so important that quality is
compromised. What we do must be of good quality”.
Another judge elaborates on the relationship between
the efficiency and quality demands: “There is a
balance between quality and efficiency. The legislation
clearly states the expectations in terms of quality and
politicians impose requirements for efficiency. And this
is a continuous balance ... There is always a new case.
At the same time, you should be able to vouch for the
decision you have made”. While judges comply with
demands for efficiency, they do not allow efficiency to
compromise quality.
The use of templates is an example on how the
judges sometimes follow rules that are taken for
granted. One of the judges explains: “The use of
templates may reduce discretion ... We base our
decisions on the information in the template without
exercising too much discretion ... And that is a risk that
we must be aware of”. Another judge describes her
reaction: “Decisions have become much simpler. I had
never written a decision as short as the templates. So
the first few times I saw them I thought; is this good
enough? Then I … looked at what others had written
… and thought; it is sufficient”. The findings show that
even though judges use templates to a large degree,
there is also an example of a judge that dismissed the
template and made necessary time to write a full
verdict: “It was a specific decision where I removed
the template text and wrote it in full. I thought it was
necessary. And then I got a call from one of the
lawyers afterwards whom thought it was very good
that I had written more than just ... because they
observe that the same text is repeated in every case …
So I realized that the dismissal of the template was
noticed”. The dismissal of the template is an exception
to the main rule, which is using the templates by habit.

6. Discussion
The findings have shown that judges may be both
aware and unaware of the influence of technology on
their discretionary power. While judges are not
necessarily aware of the emergent effects of ICT, they
clearly argue against any reduction in their freedom to
make decisions. The arguments are based on
contextual factors. Figure 1 exemplifies how a
contextual factor (here illustrated by the degree of
dependence on other organizations in the institutional
field) serves as a categorical moderating variable (the
dependence is either low or high).
The discussion of contextual factors can be
organized along three lines of arguments; how street-
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Low degree
of dependence

Technology

Discretion

Significant difference?
High degree
of dependence

Technology

Discretion

Figure 1. Contextual factor moderating
technology and discretion
level bureaucrats prioritize between rival value
positions, the nature of service provision, and the
interaction with technology. The two former arguments
are related to legitimacy since street-level bureaucrats
argue for why their discretionary power is needed. The
latter argument explains the effects that technology has
the ability to create [42].

6.1. Prioritizing between rival value positions
Rival value positions are justified or rejected based
on contextual factors. For example, the efficiency ideal
is considered inappropriate when cases of high social
complexity are taken into account. Likewise, the
efficiency ideal is favored when considering cases of
less social complexity such as speeding.
Judges accept technology as a tool for improving
efficiency and quality. When rival value positions are
challenged, a survey of Danish local authority
managers showed a heavy bias towards efficiency [23].
While the chief judge emphasizes efficiency as
important, he states that high quality is expected from
society and politicians through law, an aspect also
taken into consideration when appointing judges to
their office. The identified normative pressure show
that judges are protective of their profession and that
the quality of a verdict is more important than the time
spent to reach a verdict. This can be illustrated by one
of the judges who dismissed the template text and
wrote a full verdict instead. She was praised by a
lawyer for doing this. What would her reaction be if
the lawyer had criticized her for using valuable time
instead of reaching a verdict quicker? One could easily
assume that it would not be as easy to dismiss the
template the next time a similar situation had occurred.
Considering this particular case, it is easier for
independent judges to prioritize the service ideal than
for other public agency managers. This is consistent
with findings by DiMaggio & Powell [35] which
proposed that “the greater the extent to which an
organizational field is dependent upon a single (or
several similar) source of support for vital resources,
the higher the level of isomorphism” (p. 155).

The degree of professionalization is varying in
street-level bureaucracies. Judges demand a high level
of autonomy. While public service agencies such as
police departments and schools also are characterized
by a high degree of professionalization, other agencies
such as social service offices have workers with
various backgrounds related to education and
experience. Professionalization is related to work
meaningfulness [2] where reducing discretion or
shifting discretionary power to other groups of people
are frown upon.

6.2. The nature of service provision
The findings seem to imply that the amount of
exercised discretionary power is largely a matter of
whether politicians want to grant street-level
bureaucrats this power or if politicians want decisions
based on schematic rules. For example, the criteria for
deciding taxes in Norway are purely schematic which
allows for automation but at the same time constrain
the possibilities for individualized treatment. This may
imply that Lipsky’s claim stating that “the nature of
service provision calls for human judgment that cannot
be programmed and for which machines cannot
substitute” [1, p. 161] may be questioned based on the
value priorities made by politicians. From the
perspective of the citizen, the opportunity to present an
individual case to a street-level bureaucrat is important
because it provides a client with the feeling that they
have been listened to. While citizens emphasize the
face-to-face contact with government that has been one
of the main characteristics of street-level bureaucracy,
ongoing discussions debate if the personal contact
between client and public service worker should be
sacrificed for rationality purposes. This sacrifice has
already taken place in several public agencies [18].
Another perspective of service provision is the
consequences of decisions that street-level bureaucrats
make. This can be illustrated by the work of the judges
where penalties can be severe, e.g., life sentence.
Automating decisions can be questioned from the rule
of law principle where citizens want to be sure that a
case has been processed thoroughly and that all
necessary aspects have been considered. This
perspective is even more important when consequences
are serious.

6.3. Interaction with technology
The ability street-level bureaucrats have to utilize
information systems is a factor moderating how ICT is
influencing discretion. Computer literacy in street-level
bureaucracies varies to a great extent. Furthermore,
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even those who are experienced with the use of
computers may have challenges with utilizing
advanced features of technology. The findings
indicated that judges could miss out of important
information because they were not able to take
advantage of all the advanced search features that the
database systems provided. This practice could
ironically lead to a result where judges that utilized the
features of the databases trusted the information
provided whereas the other judges had to exercise their
discretionary power instead.
In addition, there are variations in terms of what
features various technologies offer. When templates
were provided, judges tended to use these because they
assisted them in a busy work life. Where judges knew
about advanced search features, they utilized these to
provide them with more information. Several studies
have provided evidence of how persuasive computer
screens can be implying that street-level bureaucrats,
as professionals, can potentially put aside their
professional and experience-based judgment and
instead choose a solution that the computer suggests.
The potential danger of this practice is that it could be
institutionalized. Even with more and more advanced
technology such as artificial intelligence, one could
argue that human judgment is needed because
computers only base their decisions on algorithms and
not on real life interpretations. While this is the reason
for why aircrafts are flown by pilots and humans are
driving cars, there is technology available that can do
the tasks of humans, e.g., aircrafts are mainly flown by
pilots during take-off and landing where the rest of the
flight is made by the autopilot.

7. Concluding remarks
Analyzing a court and drawing on neo-institutional
theory, the influence of ICT on the discretionary power
of street-level bureaucrats is investigated and the
moderating effect of contextual factors is sought
explicated. This study shows that ICT influences the
discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats
depending on factors related to context here identified
as: (1) social complexity, (2) societal role of a public
agency, (3) degree of professionalization, (4) computer
literacy, (5) the degree to which face-to-face contact is
required or desired, and (6) the potential consequences
of decisions. Moreover, in this study the utilization of
databases was highly dependent on the skills of the
street-level bureaucrats. In addition, the information
processing software used to organize the workflow
contained templates that was found to have a habitual
effect on the street-level bureaucrats.

Previous research has mainly focused on the effects
of changes in the discretionary power of street-level
bureaucrats, and evaluations of these effects. This
research contributes to the e-government literature by
focusing on the contextual factors that moderate the
influence ICT has on street-level discretion, and by
considering how functions and capabilities of
technology may influence the phenomenon.
Furthermore, this study utilizes concepts from neoinstitutional theory which is not known to have been
previously applied in this research area.
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